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This debate has evolved to the point where there is now some
agreement that there are significant commonalities between modal
and amodal representations and processes. However, disagree-
ments remain about the interpretation of experimental results.
Some of these disagreements, along with points of agreement, are
discussed below. There has been increasing research activity on
the physiological side of this issue, and the next few years may
provide much more definitive evidence about the relationship
between modal and amodal representations.
The Stereo Cross
My transparent cross did not evoke the modal–amodal differ-
ence seen in Anderson and Julesz’s (1995) opaque cross, and my
results show that the depth asymmetry remained, falsifying Ander-
son’s claim that the asymmetry was caused by this difference.
Anderson and Julesz’s theory of interocular contrast differences
does not predict my results either because the Michelson contrast
differences in my transparent cross are zero. There was no indi-
cation in Anderson and Julesz about what measure of contrast they
had intended. However, because we are essentially talking about a
bipartite local image patch with a single contrast edge, Michelson
contrast would clearly be a reasonable choice. Anderson (2007b) said,
How are such phenomena to be understood, and what is their rela-
tionship to modal and amodal completion? One set of images involves
amodal completion and the other does not, so Albert’s (2007) line of
argument with our stereo cross (Anderson & Julesz, 1995) suggests
that he believes that there are fundamental differences in the compu-
tations responsible for the percepts in these different displays. (p. 517)
The whole point of my transparent version is to suggest that the
same computation is going on in both versions, which would
explain why they both have the same stability asymmetry. Ander-
son’s claim that the asymmetry is caused by the modal–amodal
difference would require that there are different computations in
the opaque and transparent versions.
Anderson and Julesz (1995) suggested that the stability asym-
metry in the opaque stereo cross is due to the relative frequency of
occlusion and camouflage in natural scenes and that this asymme-
try simply carries over to the transparent case via interocular
contrast mechanisms even though the modal–amodal relative fre-
quency argument is not valid in the transparent case. Why should
the visual system tune its mechanisms to relative frequency in the
opaque case but ignore relative frequency in the transparent case?
Anderson provided no answer. In addition to the mitigating factors
regarding Anderson’s frequency arguments discussed in Albert
(2007), I suggest that breaking camouflage can be much more
important than amodal completion for object recognition in natural
images. For example, if I see the head of a tiger peering from
behind a rock, I can recognize the tiger’s presence without needing
much help from amodal completion. In contrast, an observer is
468 THEORETICAL NOTESgenerally unaware of the presence, much less the identity, of a
camouflaged object until modal completion processes segregate it
from its background.
Models
Anderson (2007b) dropped all discussion of the dual-process model
of the Petter effect that he proposed in Anderson (2007a), and he
apparently now disavows it. Anderson (1997) described glass effects
as “vivid stereoscopic illusory ‘glass’ surfaces” (p. 444). In contrast,
Anderson and Julesz (1995) described them as weak and unstable.
Anderson (2007b) seemed to favor Anderson and Julesz’s view, yet
the theory he advocated (interocular contrast differences) offers ab-
solutely no explanation of this instability. In fact, as it stands, it
predicts that these contour interpolations should be at least as stable as
the ones seen in displays where contrast polarity is preserved because
they are simply regarded as being doubly supported by having induc-
ers on both sides. This prediction is contrary to Anderson’s (2007b)
view that the percepts in contrast-reversing stimuli are less strong/
stable (which I agree with), and it directly contradicts Anderson et
al.’s (2002) results with the striped aperture.
Anderson’s (2007b) point about Rubin (2001) showing that
modal contours can continue as amodal, but not the reverse, is
interesting. In the model I previously suggested, modal comple-
tions are represented by stronger V1/V2 signals than amodal
completions, which could explain this asymmetry. The model also
fits well with the percepts seen in Kellman, Garrigan, Shipley, and
Keane’s (2007) Figure 7 and other similar displays and with Bakin,
Nakayama, and Gilbert’s (2000) results showing that properties of
real contours, such as their depth, border ownership, and salience,
can be influenced by amodal interpolation. Anderson (2007b)
argued for continuity in the neural processing of transparency
stimuli as simulated transmittance goes to zero and the stimulus
becomes opaque, which seems reasonable. So, consider a stimulus
that evokes amodal completion of a background surface behind an
opaque occluder. Let the occluder gradually increase its transmit-
tance. It seems unlikely (in my view and according to Anderson’s
continuity view) that whatever neural representation is responsible
for the amodal completion of the background contour would
suddenly vanish (e.g., via suppression) as soon as the occluded part
of its contour became barely visible. If this is correct, then the
representation of this contour would be the same as that of the
amodal contour plus some additional activity that makes the con-
tour visible and that is carried along with the basic contour repre-
sentation. Similarly, modal illusory contours would include this
additional activity in their representations, making them visible. I
propose that relatable contours would need to have at least one
active visibility process to propagate visibility along an interpola-
tion. On this account, the sense in which there is an identity
between modal and amodal contours is that they share a common
core representation (which may constitute most of the amodal
representation). This view also would provide another explanation
for why modal contours can continue as amodal but not the
reverse: Two modal contours could join up underneath an occluder
by suppressing the visibility activity along this segment (perhaps
triggered by occlusion cues). However, amodal contours do not
carry visibility activity, so they could not modally interpolate
across an unoccluded segment.
Other Comments on Anderson (2007b)
On p. 520, Anderson (2007b) said,
If surface properties are not separable from the contour interpolation
mechanisms and shifts in surface properties (such as border owner-
ship) can be induced by changing relative depth, then the modal or
amodal status of contours can alter the shape of interpolated contours,
which contradicts the identity hypothesis.
In the serrated edge, the change in relative disparity causes both the
change in border ownership and the change from modal to amodal
completion. Anderson claimed that the change from modal to amodal
completion causes the change in the shape of the interpolated con-
tours. I claim it is the change in border ownership. In my variant of the
serrated edge, the change in relative disparity causes a change from
modal to amodal completion without changing the border ownership
of the inducing contours or the shape of the interpolated contours, but
the display is otherwise very similar to the original serrated edge. This
suggests that the cause of the change in the shape of the interpolated
contours is not the change in relative disparity per se or the change
from modal to amodal completion, but the change in border owner-
ship. On pp. 520–521, Anderson (2007b) said,
Second, Albert’s proposal that there is a bias for the visual system to
interpolate smaller figural regions is contradicted by our star demonstra-
tion....I fthere was a general bias for the visual system to interpret
smaller regions as figural, both the modal and the amodal variants of the
star display should appear as five separate occluding wedges. . . . This is
not what observers report.
There are many geometric factors that are well known to influence
figure–ground organization (along with fixation and attention). Be-
cause of space limitations, I will not go into detail about why Ander-
son’s argument is wrong. I only suggest that he might want to reconsider
whether he has actually disproved the gestalt rule that smaller, sur-
rounded regions tend to be seen as figure, as he has claimed.
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